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Public & Private Order: Law, Race, Morality, and
the Antebellum Courts of Louisiana, 1830-1860
By Gwendoline Alphonso

*

I

n the summer of 1852, Mildred Ann Jackson, a “goodlooking quadroon” who worked as a “seamstress” and
“hairdresser” in New Orleans, “broke through three doors” to
escape out of a “negro yard.” Jackson then disguised herself in
male attire and successfully fled to France.1 In another instance,
Charlotte Levy, a white woman, signed a lease in November 1858
agreeing to rent an eleven-room house at the corner of Carondelet and Canal Streets in New Orleans for $50 a month to Mary
Wise, a mulatto slave fraudulently denominated in the lease as
free woman of color (f.w.c.) with P.L. McRae and Thomas Foster,
both white, signing on as sureties to guarantee that agreement.2
Mary Wise and her daughter Ella, comfortably lived in the house
with their own vast furnishings until Wise’s arrest for arson
sometime later. In a third case, John Trumbull, a white man,
died in June 1856, while “being notorious” for living in “open
concubinage” with his “mullatress” slave, Rachael, for many years,
and having five children by her. In his hand written will, he
emancipated Rachael and their five children, attempting to
bequeath one-third of his estate to them.3
In antebellum Louisiana, whites, blacks, and mulattoes lived
complex, intertwined lives that often defied the racialized social
order of a slave society,4 their private practices often transgress-
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ing the rigid statutory order of a slave state.5 By leasing a fine
house in the French Quarter section, Mary Wise, a slave, along
with her white sureties contravened local ordinances that
prohibited enslaved blacks from entering into contracts.6 By
breaking out and escaping, Mildred Ann Jackson and many
hundreds like her directly flouted laws against runaway slaves
along with legal rules that compelled bondsmen to always submit
to the slaveholder.7 Attempting to manumit and bequeath part
of his estate to his slave mistress, John Trumbull, like many
others, violated crucial legal bars against concubinage and
miscegenation and challenged the legal order in which only
white heirs had legitimate claims to the property of a decedent.8
Scholars of southern legal history have long noted the
competing, often contradictory, features of antebellum southern
society, reflected in its laws and judicial pronouncements.
Personal honor and private means of conflict resolution (such as
duels) existed in tandem with an attachment to the larger
community and deference for written laws.9 Long-standing
commitments to personal autonomy and moral discretion, or
often indiscretions, of white men coexisted alongside a preoccupation with rigid public morality and social order.10 Existing
scholarship also points to the discrepancies between formal law
and lived practices in the South in terms of slavery and race.11
Laura Edwards, in her path-breaking book The People and their
Peace, highlights the coexistence of disparate outcomes within the
antebellum legal system of the south, wherein formal rights-based
state law coexisted with, often contradictory, localized conceptions of “peace.” In Edwards’ account, the centrality of localized
law within southern legal systems enabled “subordinates to
exercise influence in law” despite being “[un]able to change or
challenge their legal subordination.”12
In New Orleans, free blacks actively engaged with civil and
political institutions in the antebellum period despite increasing
statutory constraints on them.13 Also, “at the level of day-to-day
interactions,” many “slaves took advantage of the gap between
rules and enforcement.”14
Several works collectively identify the dissonance between the
public (statutory) order and lived, private practices accommodated within southern law, some suggesting how they nonetheless
cohere,15 others suggesting otherwise,16 few identify the mecha-
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nisms by which both could coexist. This Article suggests one such
mechanism found in play in antebellum Louisiana: institutional
variance between the local courts on the one hand, and the
Louisiana Supreme Court on the other. It argues that the courts
at each level, reflecting different institutional legacies, demonstrate marked differences in how they viewed social relations,
their own institutional roles, and their approaches to social order.
Thus, although both courts upheld social order by guaranteeing
white male privileges, local courts were more apt to do so, with
the supreme court additionally emphasizing public policy and the
statutory public order. By so doing, local courts were, in fact,
more accommodating of social permeation and discrepant private
practices that served the interests of individual white men than
the supreme court which also operated as the guardian of
legislative will and statutory laws. The existence of both levels, as
well as their fluctuating interdynamic, enabled public and private
concerns to coexist, intersect, and dually define the parameters
of accepted behavior within its law.
This Article thus follows in Edwards’ analytical revisionist
framework that stresses the importance of bottom-up localized
law, local legal norms, culture, and inconsistencies alongside
more formal, top-down state law.17 However, it modifies Edwards’ framework in three ways. First, the focus is on Louisiana,
a state steeped in the civil law system, rather than on the
Carolinas (the object of Edwards’ inquiry) that followed the
common law system. Thus the overarching institutional framework, rules, and legacy of the courts of this study differ from that
in Edwards’ examination. Second, whereas in Edwards’ account
the local and state courts of the Carolinas operate more or less
separately, as a result of their own differing institutional logics,
this Article highlights a greater institutional inter-connection
between the two judicial levels, wherein inter-level dynamics such
as borrowing and competition between state and local courts also
inform how they operate. Third, unlike Edwards’ much larger
cross-issue post-Revolutionary study my inquiry is limited to cases
of race and racial indeterminacy in Louisiana in the three
decades just preceding the Civil War, and from that more narrow
scope, the Article develops heuristics of “public” and “private”
order that are not found elsewhere.
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In its focus on public and private approaches to social (and
legal) order, this Article also contributes to wider conservations
regarding nineteenth-century legal development. Legal historians
have long debated the competing centrality of private and public
orientations on nineteenth-century legal development. On the
one hand, many have emphasized the prominence of (laissez
faire) liberal individualist principles in guiding nineteenth-century
law, characterized by a weak state and courts that “released the
creative energy” of individuals through extensive protection of
private rights such as property and contract.18 On the other
hand, others have demonstrated nineteenth-century jurisdictions
as being more concerned with community and collective (or
public) order, legal development revolving instead on a commitment to a well-ordered or well-regulated society, in which morals
were policed extensively and private rights were often subordinated to the welfare of the society.19 Most do not look at inter-level
dynamics within a single (state) jurisdiction as enshrining these
multiple judicial outlooks and so constructing social order in
diverse, inter-related, ways as I do here. Institutional complexity
suggests that neither one — public order or private rights — was
exclusive but that both had important roles to play in how courts
navigated, and constructed, social behavior.
Following a section on case selection and methodology, this
Article is divided into three main parts. The first section examines legislative developments accompanying the incorporation of
common law into antebellum Louisiana and identifies patterns in
the responses of the Louisiana Supreme Court and local courts
vis-à-vis race and the construction of racialized social order. The
second section discusses the varied responses by the supreme
court and local courts to jury trials, demonstrating their interlevel dynamic in this regard and how that served to instantiate
their differing approaches to social order. The third section
explores the deep-seated differences in conceptions of morality
contained in supreme court and local court decisions, also
further engendering institutional variance in their construction
of racialized social order. The conclusion sums up the main
findings and discusses implications for existing and future
research.
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I. Case Selection & Methodology
This study is based on the trial manuscript records of the
Louisiana Supreme Court, which are housed in Account No. 106
in the Earl K. Long Library at the University of New Orleans.
Although some of the records are now digitized, this was not the
case at the time of research such that the physical record of each
trial manuscript file was read in its entirety. All case transcript
files examined were handwritten and contained copies of the trial
court case, including attorney’s arguments, depositions, written
interrogatories, bills of exceptions, the clerk’s summary of the
testimony and the copies of the original hand-written opinions,
appellate briefs, and the judgments of the trial and supreme
court (often with errors crossed out and writing in the margins).
These transcripts were preserved because the decisions were
appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court and ultimately
deposited in the University of New Orleans. The transcript file is
the only existing record of the case at the trial level and allows
a researcher to “follow” a case from the local court to the
supreme court (sometimes twice over) comparing judicial
attitudes at each level. This rich archive also provides details of
the social contexts in which the people lived and in which the
courts functioned, much more than the bare judicial decision
alone.
The case records examined are those that were tried in
parish and district courts in Louisiana between 1820 and 1860
and ultimately reached the supreme court. I searched the
indexes and texts of JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN
SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO,20 Louisiana Digest: 1809 to Date,21
LITIGATING WHITENESS: TRIALS OF RACIAL DETERMINATION IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH 22 and SLAVERY, THE CIVIL LAW,
AND THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA23 for cases associated
with race and skin color, using the keywords: “color,” “white,”
“black,” or “mulatto” [often within a main heading, such as
“slaves.”].
The cases selected are those in which the person’s color was
a legal issue because of the indeterminacy of a person’s color, or
because their color affected their value or appraisal as a slave, or
because it resulted in contestable presumptions and behavior
(example: mistaking a jailed, free woman of color as a slave
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because of her “black” skin color, leading to her whipping as a
runaway). The rationale for the focus on color is based on the
assumption that race was the most significant status distinction in
the social order of a slave state and often enveloped other
intertwined statuses such as gender, age etc. By selecting cases in
which color or race was at issue, I hope to assemble a sample of
meaningful judicial decisions from which to access the attitudes
of Louisiana judges regarding how a central status (race) and
associated statuses related, if at all, to social order, and how its
boundaries should be policed, if at all.
Of these color-based cases, I further selected only those
involving either persons of “mixed” color (called “mulattoes,”
“griffes,” or “quadroons”) or else of “indeterminate” color whose
very racial identity was to be determined. The decision to focus
on mixed and indeterminate people of color follows from the
acknowledged position that light-skinned people of color in
Louisiana, enslaved or free, had a unique, intermediate position,
with greater capacity and incentive to “permeate” (and obscure)
the social order of a slave society than most others.24 Thus, the
adjudication of their claims or their color, or both, is illustrative
of effective “moments” in which judges would or would not
reproduce the racialized social order, rationalizing and enforcing
(or not) the boundaries between white and black along the way.
This two-step process of selection yielded twenty-one case
transcript files, each consisting of approximately fifty to several
hundred pages of documents. Some cases were tried multiple
times in local courts, resulting in a total of forty-four decisions,
across trial courts and supreme court decisions. Each was coded
separately. Because I am interested in race distinctions and how
the courts viewed those distinctions, I constructed a second data
set where each judicial decision was separated for every mulatto
or indeterminate person — man, woman, or child — who was a
party to the case. In most cases there was only one such party
but some contained “families,” so I coded each judicial decision,
at the trial court and supreme court levels, separately for each
party (sometimes judges would rule differently in the cases of
women versus children for example). This resulted in a second
N of 51 and not 44 (the number of judicial decisions/units of
analysis in the first dataset). Charts and figures present the
findings for each dataset, some with an N of 44 and one with the
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N of 51. For both data sets I coded each analytical case for the
kinds of social order they evidenced, the legal sources used, racial
order effected (or not), the case type, social order ideology, and
— in the second dataset — the race and gender of each individ
ual. The race and gender of the party of the case was not found
to yield statistical differences for the judicial outcome, so charts
or discussions of these variables were excluded. However, the
second data set is used to display variations in “interventionism”
as per each “colored” party to the cases. The purpose of statistical
analysis is to determine whether there were systematic differences
in the judicial ideologies of racialized social order across
individuals and court levels. I use the forty-four judicial decisions
more as a sample of judicial ideologies, not intending them to be
exhaustive. The descriptive statistical analysis is used to supplement the in-depth content analysis of each case transcript file.
Judicial decisions in this Article represent the exercise of
state discretion, the ways by which the courts, as state institutions,
implemented and constructed racialized social order. These
decisions are as much cultural artifacts, the judicial response to
prevailing social practices, as acts of state power: judges interpreting and applying the “legislative will.” The cases represent
contingent moments in development of slave states in which
courts had occasion to interpret and implement legislative
mechanisms to fashion “social order” in their own way.

II. Hardening of Racial Boundaries, Incorporation
of Common Law & The Louisiana Courts
in the Antebellum Era
In the antebellum era, Louisiana underwent extensive
change. Amidst the rising criticism from northern anti-slavery
forces, political elites tinkered with legislation, tightening their
control over the lives of their slaves, free blacks, and other
subordinate groups. Louisiana had been, consecutively, a French
and Spanish colony prior to its purchase by the United States in
1803 and Creoles jostled with Americans in the exercise of social
and political power.25 Louisiana also experienced extensive
agricultural expansion and economic prosperity, as legal historian
Judith Schafer notes, “Lousianians increasingly believed that
slavery was an essential element not only for economic success
but for social order.”26 With the coming of American rule, all
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whites in Louisiana (Americans, French and Spanish-speaking
Creoles, and West Indians alike) began to seek harsher restrictions on people of color, legally differentiating them more clearly
than before from whites.27
When Louisiana became an American territory in 1806, it
adopted a “Black Code.” The Black Code, stricter than the
preceding Spanish slave law, upheld a three-tiered racial caste
system, which distinguished between whites, gens de couleur libre
(“free people of color”), and slaves, in regard to a multitude of
actions such as: punishment for rape or attempted rape “upon
the body of any white female,” arson, the destruction of crops,
causing “insult or assault and beating of any white person,”
“carrying arms,” traveling to and from the state, residency limits,
employment upon steamboats and other vessels, testifying before
court, service on juries, participation in elections, holding public
office, serving in the militi, and in capacity for inheritance and
exercise of paternal authority.28
The Black Code also added a provision that “free people of
colour ought never to insult or strike white people, nor presume
to conceive themselves equal to the white; but on the contrary
that they ought to yield to them in every occasion and never
speak or answer to them but with respect, under the penalty of
imprisonment.”29 When Louisiana compiled its existing laws into
the Digest of 1808, it stipulated that free people of color must be
clearly identified in all legal documents as “f.m.c.” or “f.w.c.”
(“free man/woman of color”).30 An ordinance in the City of
New Orleans began to require that all women of color, free and
black, distinguish themselves by wearing headscarves.
Other laws tightened the binds of slavery by prohibiting
slaves from purchasing their own freedom (a practice called
“coartacion,” inherited from Spanish reign and previously long
practiced in Louisiana), limiting manumission, and curtailing the
emigration or settlement of “free negroes or malattos.”31 In the
years following its entry into the Union, Louisiana law thus more
keenly began to emphasize racial distinctions between people,
characterized in the 1825 Civil Code as “distinctions of persons
which are established by law,” to differentiate between slaves, free
people, and whites.32
As a consequence of the statutory hardening of race-based
distinctions, the number of cases before the courts in which color
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or race appeared as a legal issue also progressively increased.
Racial distinctions in Louisiana were invoked mainly in four kinds
of cases, broadly definable as: (a) cases of “white slavery” — when
light-skinned women claimed to be wrongfully enslaved on the
basis of their (white) race or skin color; (b) cases of inter-racial
sex — when the race and inter-racial sexual connection of
mulatto mistresses (slave or free) and white men were at issue in
claims to his property; (c) cases of “passing” — when lightskinned “white” men brought suits of slander against other
individuals for calling them “coloured” and (d) cases of “passing
as free” — when the skin color of mulatto individuals was used
to presume them free or enslaved. Cumulatively, across all four
categories there is an overall, marked, increase in the number of
cases decided by the courts. In other words, the courts were
increasingly called upon to decide cases whose outcome pivoted
on race. By the 1850s, many more cases involving inter-racial sex,
“whites” claiming race-based slander, and mulattoes passing as
free and claiming wrongful imprisonment reached the courts.
Table 1: Race-Based Cases before Louisiana
Local & Supreme Courts, 1830-1860

In the antebellum period, as the statutes progressively
hardened boundaries around a more rigid, stratified, social
order, the courts were confronted with more real life instances
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of possible social permeation and racialized “disorder,” presenting them with greater opportunity to themselves construct and
order society.
Within statutory social ordering, the law upheld the superiority, liberty, and authority of white men over all others. In
Louisiana, as in other slave states, the totality of the power of the
white master over his slaves is an extreme example of the
patriarchal quality of its legal order.33 A slave was by definition
subjugated to the authority of his master, defined in the Civil
Code as, “…one who is in the power of the master to whom he
belongs…he can do nothing, possess nothing or acquire anything
but what must belong to his master.”34 However, slaves were
only a part of the sphere of the patriarchal authority guaranteed
to white men by law (including planters and yeomen, slaveholders and non-slaveholders), instead the law upheld the legal
dominion of men over all others: women, free persons, and
children.35 As the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 stated,
Laws on account of the difference of sexes have established between men
and women essential differences with respect to their civil, social and
political rights. Men are capable of all kinds of engagements and
functions, unless disqualified by reasons and causes applying to particular
individuals. Women cannot be appointed to any public office, not perform
any civil functions, except those which the law specifically declares them
capable of exercising.36

Louisiana law subjugated the wife to the authority of her
husband, requiring that she be “bound to follow her husband
and to live with him wherever he chooses to reside,” that she
“cannot appear in court without the authority of her husband,”
“possess her property separate from her husband,” or even when
she is separate in estate from her husband “cannot alienate,
grant, mortgage or acquire either by gratuitous or incumbered
title” without her husband’s consent or concurrence.37 Children
were also firmly under their father’s authority, and paternal
rights extended to their education and administration of their
estates.38 Unlike white men, free men of color in Louisiana were
limited in their civil and political rights — they could not vote,
nor hold political office or serve on juries, the laws also progressively restricted the movement and economic activities of all free
people of color.39 In antebellum Louisiana, the law constructed
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a deeply stratified, hierarchical (public) social order that upheld
white men’s privileges and authority over all others.
In deciding cases of race-based claims, the courts too
evidence a pattern of upholding white male prerogatives. As seen
in the figure below, the courts upheld a patriarch’s rights more
often than they decided against them (twenty-three cases
upholding and twenty-one against) however they were more apt
to do so in the earlier decades of the antebellum period. By the
1850s, the courts were deciding more against the rights of the
patriarch than in favor of them, holding them more firmly to
statutory order than before.
Figure 2: Upholding Patriarchal Rights in Louisiana,
Local & Supreme Courts, 1830-1960

The acquisition of Louisiana by the United States also
unsettled its abiding civil law legacy. Civil law had been an
integral part of Louisiana’s French and Spanish colonial past, and
its people were accustomed to civil law principles. Upon its entry
into the Union, native Louisianians feared the imposition of the
American common law system, which was based on judge-made
law rather than upon a written code.40 Whereas the American
common law system focused on protection of individual rights
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through various legal mechanisms such as: trial by jury, presumption of innocence, habeas corpus, and stare decisis; the civil law
system was more concerned with public order and majoritarian
good in which individual legal protections were mostly absent.41
Table 2: Characteristics of District & Supreme Courts’
Decisions, Louisiana 1830-1860
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Following the Purchase of 1803, the considerable efforts to
Americanize Louisiana’s laws thus came up against its civil law
legacy. In its first constitution in 1812 (and later constitutions
thereafter) the overwhelming preference for civil law resulted in
provisions forbidding the legislature from imposing any general
and unspecific form of law, such as the common law, upon the
state, and requiring the supreme court to justify each and every
decision by citing specific acts of legislature or articles in the Civil
Code.42 As the Civil Code in 1825 asserted in its very first article,
“law is a solemn expression of Legislative will,” the written code
was elevated above judicial discretion.
However, the majority of judges and justices appointed to
the Louisiana Supreme Court in the antebellum period were
American attorneys, trained in common law and not native
Louisianians, and were apt to meld common law principles onto
their adopted civilian legacy. 43 Moreover, as the nineteenth
century wore on, statutes began to increasingly incorporate
principles of individualized, American common law, also
intermixing judicial discretion and individual rights with the
more long-standing civilian emphasis on public order and the
written law.44
In the race-based cases, judges on the Louisiana Supreme
Court followed their mandate to uphold legislative will, dutifully
citing relevant statutory provisions in most decisions. At other
times, they constructed elaborate attempts to insert their own
interpretation of legislative intent or to ignore legislative dicta
altogether.45 In keeping with its elevated stature, supreme court
decisions were longer in page length than trial court opinions
and relied more on complex statutory status distinctions rather
than on jury opinion in deciding a case (see Table 2 opposite
page). The supreme court frequently reversed rather than
affirmed trial court rulings — reversing fourteen cases and
affirming only six.
Perhaps due to its institutional mandate and preeminence,
the supreme court more frequently cited public policy and public
order concerns as opposed to local courts that almost exclusively
decided cases narrowly, as an adjudication of private interests.
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court too was far more likely
to adjudicate on the basis of private interests, it was also four
times more likely to refer to “public order” or “public policy” in
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the cases examined than the local courts, this difference is
statistically significant.
Table 3: Private Interests & Public Order, as Decision
Focus in Louisiana Local & Supreme Courts, 1830-1860

As seen in Table 3, in a little over one- third of the cases
examined, the supreme court referred to public order, especially
in cases involving inter-racial sex. The high court invoked public
order in five out of eight cases in comparison to local courts,
which did not invoke public order at all. The supreme court, for
example, repeatedly upheld the absolute nullity of contracts such
as marriage between free persons of color and whites, described
as “tainted with motives (contrary to) public order.”46
In cases involving mulatto concubines of white men, the
Louisiana Supreme Court reiterated the importance of the article
of the Civil Code that prohibited most bequests to concubines,
as “an explicit provision of law of great importance to the order,
decency and well-being of society.”47 The court asserted, “the
letter of this law is positive, its last disposition is prohibitive in its
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application; it destroys the right which the testator might have
had of disposing of any other part of his succession indiscriminately.”48 Thus, despite its overarching deference to white men’s
privileges, the supreme court was also cognizant of statutory,
public order objectives, sometimes in the face of the private
wishes and prerogatives of a white master especially when it
involved inter-racial sexual liaisons.49
Statutory public order and attendant legislative preeminence
were also invoked by supreme court decisions in suits of freedom
brought by mulatto slaves claiming to have been freed by
deceased masters. Here too, the supreme court differentiated an
“action for freedom” from “an ordinary case of private right”
insofar “as it concerns the public that none but worthy persons
should be admitted to the status of freemen.”50 The supreme
court strictly upheld the 1857 legislative ban against emancipation, extending its application retroactively to acts of manumission that preceded its enactment but were not executed before
the passage of the act, writing “the subject of enfranchisement of
slaves is one over which the State was always exercised a controlling power . . . the policy of the State has annexed conditions
to the enfranchisement of slaves, which the court cannot permit
to be disregarded.”51
In other instances, the supreme court made attempts to
establish the boundaries of existing legislation by inserting its
interpretation of legislative intent, preserving in these instances
its own view of social order over statutory pronouncements. In
the case of Foster v. Mish,52 the court loosely relied on article 10
of the Civil Code (which provided that a deed of manumission
made in another state was governed by the laws of the state
where it was made) to import the common law of Kentucky to
the case of Andy Foster, previously a free resident of color there
who had been captured and sold into slavery in Louisiana. In so
doing, the court disregarded the strict 1857 ban on emancipation
and allowed Foster to recover his freedom. The court firmly
stated its interpretation of social order (where free people cannot
be wrongfully re-enslaved) and the applicatory limits of the 1857
law thereto, protecting its own institutional legitimacy along the
way.
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It is a grave error to suppose, that free persons of color, who have
been wrongfully and illegally deprived of their freedom, and sold into
slavery in this State, have no right of action in our courts for the recovery
of their liberty. If no right of action in such cases existed, then free
negroes might be kidnapped in part of the Union, and sold into slavery
in this State, with impunity — a species of slave-trade, which our Legislature never intended to legalize by the Act of 1857, prohibiting emancipation.53

With less institutional heft than the supreme court and
similarly bound to the written code as per the civilian system,
local courts applied statutes more mechanically — without
attempting to interpret legislative intent or to examine underlying public policy objectives. In the case of Andy Foster, Judge
Price of the New Orleans Fourth District Court, admitted that the
evidence conclusively showed that Andy Foster was born free in
the State of Kentucky but in the light of prior supreme court
decisions and “considering the act of the Legislature prohibiting
emancipation of slaves in this State,” he dismissed Foster’s
petition for freedom.54 The majority of trial judges’ opinions
were brief statements of the decision rendered, less than a page
in length with little or no elaboration of the nature or scope of
the law applied.
The local courts evidence a strong pattern of preserving the
private property interests of slaveholders, affirming the rights of
the master or patriarch over his dominion. In Turner, Curator v.
Smith,55 Justice Ratcliff of West Feliciana Parish wrote, “it is very
difficult to circumscribe the authority of the master.”56 In an
unusually lengthy thirteen-page opinion, Justice Ratcliff went so
far as to refuse to follow the supreme court Justice Preston’s
decision in Vail v. Bird57 to limit a master’s capacity to bequeath
his slave concubine her freedom. Asserting that a slave did not
“have a will of her own,” and so could not consent or refuse the
advances of an unscrupulous master, Justice Ratcliff maintained
that a slave woman could not be considered a concubine. In this
unusually lengthy opinion, he cautioned against the implications
of the supreme court’s decision to view a slave as a consenting
concubine, stating: “Grant the slave the right to determine for
himself — what is and what is not a lawful exercise of power by
the master over him, and you destroy at once and forever the
relation of master and slave.”58 Concerned with not disturbing
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the private rights of the master/patriarch over his slave, the trial
court found in favor of the slave concubine, granting her the
freedom bequeathed to her by her master.
For two-thirds of the parties of color in the cases examined,
local courts preserved the private interests and prerogatives of
the related patriarch. In contrast, the supreme court handed
down many more decisions limiting a master/patriarch often in
the name of public order, doing as much for over half of the
parties examined. The more preservationist character of the trial
courts (vis-à-vis the supreme court) can also be seen from the
finding that the outcome of local courts’ decisions was mostly
non-interventionist, not disturbing social practices (such as
miscegenation or passing) but maintaining the existing status
quo.
The outcome of supreme court decisions for these same
parties of color, on the other hand, was somewhat different.
Evidencing a greater concern with public order and adopting a
more formalistic approach, the supreme court was, in effect,
more interventionist and decided the dispute more often against,
rather than for the master/patriarch. These differences across
the courts are also statistically significant using both chi-square
and column proportions (z) tests.
Although the trial courts and the supreme court were closely
bound to the written law as per Louisiana’s civilian system and
guaranteed white men’s rights as enshrined within that statutory
order, the supreme court — due to the composition of its judges
and its own institutional stature — more often independently
interpreted legislative intent and assessed the implications of a
case for overall public order. Trial courts, in contrast, with much
less acknowledgment of a case’s public order implications, were
more mechanical in their use of statutes and more focused on its
individual adjudication. The courts also differed in how they
regarded jury trials and in the relative weight they attributed to
juries’ opinions, further inscribing the supreme court’s additional
role as preserver of public order alongside the trial courts’ sole
role as guarantors of private (patriarchal) interests.

C:\WP51\DEMO.FMT

134

Tue, 09-Feb-16 02:46 pm

JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN LEGAL HISTORY

Table 4: Interventionism in Local & Supreme Courts’
Race-Based Decisions, by Parties of Color,
Louisiana 1830-1860

III. Reliance on Juries
In the Judiciary Act of 1813, the newly-created Louisiana
state legislature gave the supreme court supervisory jurisdiction
over inferior courts and authority to make rules regulating their
procedure not inconsistent with law.59 Judgment was to be given
as justice required, and the court interpreted this provision as
giving it power to independently review the facts in most cases.
Although the federal government allowed Louisiana to retain its
civil law heritage, it required that trial by jury, a common law
practice, be afforded in all causes.60 Trial by jury was incorporated into Louisiana’s civilian legal system through the 1825 Code
of Practice (articles 493-532). Whereas rehearings by a jury had
been permitted by the previous territorial superior court, the
Louisiana Supreme Court ruled in Brooks v. Weyman,61 that an

C:\WP51\DEMO.FMT

Tue, 09-Feb-16 02:46 pm

PUBLIC & PRIVATE ORDER

135

appeal brought before the court could not be heard by a jury,
stating, “[m]uch as every man must be convinced of the necessity
of the appellate power, as contemplated by the constitution and
the laws, the introduction of juries into the tribunals of the last
resort, can have no other tendency than to render everything
unsettled . . . . ”62 By so precluding juries from its deliberations,
the supreme court strengthened its own institutional hand over
local court decisions and its institutional stature as the “court of
last resort.”63
Jury reliance also highlights trial courts overriding character
as essentially conservative local arenas embodying the prevailing
attitudes and sentiments of the local community. Through juries,
local court judges embedded their decisions in the existing
private social practices of the local community. This was especially prominent in cases involving slander and “passing.” By allowing
juries to determine who was and who was not white, local court
decisions displayed their ongoing preoccupation with maintaining
the status quo, intervening as little as possible into the organic
private social relations of the community.
In the case of Boullemet v. Phillips,64 Stephen Boullemet
brought a suit of slander against Alexander Phillips for allegedly
spreading false and malicious rumors that he and his family were
“colored persons.” Judge Charles Marrian of the New Orleans
Parish Court felt bound by the legislature to uphold the jury’s
decisions to award $4000 (an astronomical amount) to the
plaintiff, although he pointedly inserted his discomfort with the
jury’s findings by also pointing out his own dissatisfaction with
jury trials in civil suits, stating:
Does the law not effectually declare that the jury are the sole judges
of evidence in which must of course be included the degree of credibility
which they may allow to the witnesses heard in the cause and I certainly
think it does and whilst I am on this subject I will avail myself of the
opportunity of declaring that I am very far from sharing in the great
admiration which many people entertain for the trial by jury. I mean in
civil matters. I hear daily very eloquent declamations as to the trial by jury
being the bulwark of liberty, the shield against despotism, etc. etc. This is
all very true in criminal matters . . . but in civil matters I am clearly of
opinion, that in a country of written law, like Louisiana, the trial by jury
is generally a poor way of obtaining justice. There are indeed a few species
of cases, and that of vindictive damages for torts (like the present) is one,
in which probably a trial by a jury is the fairest way of assessing the
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damages, because such cases are mostly dependent upon facts and
feelings. Be that as it may, however, as long as our Legislature preserve
the trial by jury in civil cases, I think it the duty of the Court to treat
verdicts with respect . . . whatever therefore my views might be of the
facts in the present case, I will not presume to consider that correct, when
in opposition to those of twelve honest and intelligent citizens.65

Louisiana Supreme Court’s Chief Justice, Francois Xavier
Martin however, exercising the court’s powers to interpret facts
and independently access the evidence regarding Boullemet’s
color, felt much less constrained by the jury’s verdict and
particularly by their finding of malice on the part of the defendant:
Our learned brother of the Parish Court . . . appears to have
concluded that, as the jury were the judges of malice and they found a
verdict against the defendant, he was bound to infer that they had found
malice; and when moved for a new trial, he doubted his right to touch
their verdict, although he informs us that he did not in any way agree with
the jury in their finding, for his views of the evidence totally differed from
theirs. Sharing with him his dissatisfaction with the finding of the jury,
and our view of the evidence, like his, totally differing from theirs, we are
bound to remember that the verdict of a jury must be set aside when
contrary to the evidence, as we held in the case of Rosseau v. Chase, 2 La.
497.66

In all three lengthy cases of slander of a “white” man found
in the case transcript archives, the local court judges based their
decisions on juries, all finding for the plaintiff who sued the
defendant for stating he was not white. In contrast, in two of the
three cases the supreme court substituted its own interpretation
of the evidence, to reverse the verdict in favor of the defendant
or else to reduce the damages awarded by the lower court.67
In awarding damages in these cases, judges at the trial and
appellate levels display differing conceptions of the injury
suffered by the plaintiff, and the severity of injury suffered from
impugning the color of an ostensibly-white person. For trial
judges, such as Judge Octave Rousseau of St. Bernard Parish who
were embedded deeply in the community, even when defendants
were purportedly merely repeating rumors without originating
them, the court was very firm to underscore the gravity of such
offense, holding, “the defendant should not escape without being
made at least to feel the impropriety of his course, on charging
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the plaintiffs to be persons of color, and in attempting to disturb
the civil status they enjoy as white persons.”68 Trial judges
consistently upheld steep damages awarded to injured plaintiffs.
On the contrary, the supreme court judges, removed from
the community, were less inclined to “imagine” the extent of
injury to the individual caused by such utterances, finding for
example “nothing in the record to show that the plaintiffs were
in any manner injured by what the defendant said.”69 Even
though the supreme court acknowledged that “the evidence is
conflicting,” the court declared, “[w]e think, however, that the
damages allowed are excessive and that little more than nominal
damages should have been given,” reducing the damages from
five hundred to fifty dollars, a fraction of the original award.70
Juries also played a central role in trials of “white slavery”
cases, in the determination of the race of a slave (always a
woman) who claimed to be wrongfully enslaved on grounds that
she was white. Jurors and trial courts were far more likely to
intervene in these cases than in the case of slander of “white”
men, almost always finding in favor of the slave and against the
title of the master. Alexina Morrison, for example, repeatedly
won over the majority of white jurors in three different trials.71
Madame Aimee Busle was not allowed to claim the price of Polly
and her child, Mary, described as “whiter than quadroons,” until
their race was determined in a separate trial.72 The supreme
court released Sally Miller from her bonds of slavery on the
“record of the complexion” and the presumption of freedom on
the basis of her light color.73
In Morrison v. White,74 the embeddedness of juries within
local communities loathe to enslave light-skinned women became
a central issue in the defendant/owner’s petition for change in
venue. The judge noted that having received a writ of sequestration, plaintiff Alexina Morrison “was taken in the society of white
persons and was even seen dancing at a ball at Carrolton, where
the most respectable white persons of the town had assembled”
whereas the “defendant was threatened with personal violence,
on account of this suit.” Judge Victor Burthe of Jefferson Parish
Court although wary of transferring the case, “to throw the
burden of the duty upon a brother judge,” thus admitted that
“the evidence leaves no doubt that it would be extremely difficult
if not altogether impossible to obtain a fair trial by a jury in this
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Parish.”75
The subsequent trial judge, H.D. Ogden of New Orleans
Parish, upheld the jury’s unanimous verdict to grant Morrison
her freedom. The supreme court reversed the judgment of the
district court on grounds that it had improperly excluded
evidence presented by the defendant. Writing for the court,
Justice Buchanan, offered his own appraisal of the evidence and
upheld instead the paramountcy of the legislature in deciding
the case.
The said [excluded] evidence has come up in the transcript, as attached
to the bills of exception. We have examined it, and find full proof therein
that the plaintiff was born a slave, the offspring of a mulatto woman slave,
and that she passed by a regular chain of conveyances, from the
possession of her original owner, the owner of her mother, to the
defendant.… [T]he presumption of freedom, arising from her color, is
not a presumption juris et de jure. It must yield to proof of a servile origin.
The Legislature has not seen fit to declare, that any number of crosses
between the negro and the white shall emancipate the offspring of the
slave; and it does not fall within the province of the judiciary to establish
any such rule of property.76

In the third and final trial, the trial judge on instruction
from the supreme court reluctantly accepted the evidence,
repeatedly recording his dissatisfaction with the supreme court’s
decree. This is recorded in the plaintiff’s numerous bill of
exceptions as thus, “ . . . said Testimony allowed to be admitted
and read as evidence on the ground that said Court was compelled to admit said testimony under the decree of the Supreme
court though the Court stated that it had it not felt bound by
said decree it would have excluded said testimony . . . . ”77
Despite inclusion of the testimony, the jury again found in
favor of Alexina Morrison (ten to two) and the trial judge
granted her freedom refusing yet another trial on grounds that
“this case is one peculiarly suited to a Jury, and especially
believing that it is for the interest of both of the parties that the
litigation should terminate.”78 The heirs of the original defendant, James White, now long deceased, filed an appeal on
grounds that “the Court erred in charging the jury, that being
the judges of the law and the evidence they could totally
disregard the judgment of the Supreme Court.”79 The case
never made it to the supreme court again as the court disbanded
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in 1862 and there are no records of what became of Morrison
thereafter.
Cases of “white slavery” thus contrasted with those of
“slander” in revealing the institutional proclivities and dynamics
of the supreme court vis-à-vis the trial courts. As the cases of
slander show, the trial courts and their juries were more concerned with maintaining existing social relations and the private
interests of the white male plaintiffs than they were intent on
ensuring public order, by warranting that only those beyond
reproach be allowed to claim white male status.80 The supreme
court, on the other hand, was more interventionist in these cases,
eschewing jury sentiments to more strictly police who could and
who could not legitimately claim the status of a white man. Yet
in the case of the enslavement of a “white” woman, juries and
trial courts were far more likely to intervene, finding for her
freedom and strongly condemning a master’s right to own a
“white” woman. The supreme court, on the other hand, was far
more dispassionate, upholding the masters’ title of ownership
rather than freeing the “white slave.” Here too the high court
invoked its role and stature as interpreter and upholder of
legislative intent and public policy to do this.
As the contrast between slander and white slavery cases
shows, gendered morality underpinned many of these decisions,
playing an important role in how the courts differentially and
complementally constructed racialized social order.

IV. Public & Private Morality
For abolitionists and southerners alike, private life and the
domestic sphere were inextricably, if uneasily, linked to a
patriarch’s public authority. The very public morality of slavery as
an economic system hinged on the private morality of the
slaveholder’s household.81 For abolitionists and critics, slavery
was not just an economic system but it was also an immoral one.
It reduced white men to sexual depravity and undermined social
order. As the noted English visitor, Harriet Martineau, remarked,
“[L]et any one look at the positive licentiousness of the south,
and declare if, in such a state of society, there can be any security
for domestic purity and peace.”82 South Carolinian, Mary Boykin
Chesnut, also wrote in scathing terms of the hypocrisy of white
men’s moral superiority, from a white woman’s perspective:
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What do you say to this? A magnate who runs a hideous black harem and
its consequences under the same roof with his lovely white wife and his
beautiful and accomplished daughters? He holds his head as high and
poses as the model of all human virtues to these poor women whom God
and the laws have given him.83

Southerners in defense of slavery instead pointed to the
innate moral superiority of the white race and, hence, of white
supremacy as a social and political system. For them, inter-racial
sexual relations were the result of either a few depraved white
individuals (rather than a systemic response) or else the consequence of the sexual wantonness of people of color. Thomas R.
Cobb, a southern lawyer writing on slavery, illustrates the
prevailing perception that the rape of a female slave by her
owner “[was] almost unheard of [as] the known lasciviousness of
the negro, rendered the possibility of its occurrence very
remote.”84 In the sphere of the household, particularly on
plantations, white men’s private liaisons with female slaves —
however extensive or exploitative — thus occurred without
disapprobation or public scrutiny.
Yet quadroon balls and the system of placage were wellestablished within New Orleans society, normalizing sexual
relations between upper-class women of color and wealthy white
men who publicly established households together.85 Brothels
and widespread prostitution by white, mulatto, and black women,
freed and slaved, also flourished in New Orleans, serving the
economic interests of the wealthiest white men and were
condoned and accommodated by city laws and enforcement.86
Race and gender intersected to create a three-tiered moral order,
affording disparate legal protection to women on the basis of
their ascribed morality. On the top were white women whose
ascribed moral virtue entitled them to their more privileged
protected status, followed by mulatto women who were entitled
to some protection but whose suspect morality made them far
more vulnerable. Black slaves were at the bottom, whose assumed
overt sexuality and sexual exploitation by white men remained
largely outside of the legal order.
Social order was inextricably tied, in many ways, to a raciallystratified, gendered moral order. The private interests of white
men, slaveholders and non-slaveholders alike, as well the public
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legitimacy of slavery and the system of white supremacy rested on
maintaining this uneven, stratified, system. In constructing
racialized social order Louisiana courts could not deny the
underlying morality or moral claims of the social system.
However, here too we find some variation in the supreme court
and the local courts’ conception of morals, either as an essentially private or also a public morality, implicating either the larger
social structure or else merely the individual litigants before
them.
Marriage, for instance, was defined in the 1825 Civil Code in
strictly private contractual terms. The Code specified that “the
law considers marriage in no other view than as a civil contract”87 and miscegenation was prohibited as a nullity arising
from the “incapacity” of certain individuals to enter into such
marriage contracts.88 Slaves and free blacks were deemed
“incapable of contracting marriage together” and the “same
incapacity” attached “to marriages contracted by free white
persons and free people of color.”89 Despite statutory insistence
on marriage as a private contract, its implications for public
morality and order were frequently pleaded in briefs and
sometimes entertained by the courts, often in reference to the
statutory provision that “individuals cannot by their conventions,
derogate from the force of laws made for the preservation of
public order or good morals.”90
In the case of Succession of Minvielle, 91 Raymond Domec
attempted to recover a sum of money from L. Barjac, executor
of the estate of Jean Michel Minvielle, on the grounds that its
adjudged recipient, Cora LaLande of New Orleans, was his wife
and he was thus the head of their matrimonial community to
which the money belonged. Cora LaLande, being made party to
the suit denied that she was his wife since “Domec [was] a white
man and she [was] a colored woman.”92 The case illustrates the
common experience of racial ambiguity in the lives of many lightskinned people, whose accommodation within the prevailing
social order itself was often fluid and fluctuating.
For example, Reverend Father Morrisset testified to the
marriage having occurred, saying that that he had seen Cora
LaLande “at the foot of the altar . . . having blessed her
marriage with Domec.” Father Morrisset also testified that
Raymond Domec “is a white man and is a Frenchman” who “has
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a face of Jewish Cast, black hair and dark complexion,” but that
he “did not know whether [LaLande] was a woman of color or
not.”93 On the other hand, another witness, Auguste Girault,
testified to having known the couple “for nine years” and swore
that LaLande “is a woman of color or what is generally called a
mulatress” and that Domec “is a Frenchman — a Gascon” whom
he had “seen . . . several times with friends from France.” None
of the witnesses made reference to the exceptional character of
this (possibly inter-racial) union. The district court accepted the
evidence regarding the color of both parties, over the objections
of Domec that the nullity of the marriage on these grounds
required a separate suit. It did not comment on the implications
of the case for public morals and instead instantly dismissed
Domec’s claim over LaLande’s property.94
In her appellate brief, Cora LaLande reiterated the nullity
of the “pretended marriage,” offering as evidence an original
statement signed by Domec and published in the New Orleans Bee,
in which “he makes known to the public that Cora LaLande is a
colored woman — that he did not know the mystery of her birth”
despite having cohabited with her several years and proclaimed
that “Cora LaLande has no right whatsoever to assume the name
of Madame Domec.”95 LaLande thus argued that the private
marriage contract was “tainted with a nullity resting on motives
of public order . . . having its origin in the respect due to good
morals, it [was] an absolute nullity,” hence she was not required
to bring a separate action “to annul a thing — which by itself was
null and void ipso facto.”96
The supreme court agreed. Chief Justice Edwin T. Merrick
was quick to point to the implications of private inter-racial
unions for public morality, “[t]he prohibition [against miscegenation] is one eminently affecting the public order . . . . The law
is of that rigorous nature that it will not permit a marriage to
exist between persons of the two different races for a moment
. . . no suit is needed to declare the nullity of such a union.” 97
The court’s strict regulation of the color line in the interest of
public morals extended to preserving the private property
interests of a free woman of color over that of her white
“husband.” The court stated, “either party may disregard [such
a marriage], and neither can pretend to derive from it any of the
consequences of a lawful marriage.”98
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In MacArty v. Mandeville,99 the supreme court similarly
upheld the property claims of Eulalie Mandeville, a wealthy free
woman of color, against the claims of the white heirs of her
deceased white companion, Eugene MacArty. MacArty’s heirs
claimed that Mandeville’s vast estate (valued at $155,000) was an
illegal donation by MacArty, contrary to Article 1468 of the Civil
Code, “which provide[d] that those who live together in open
concubinage are respectively incapable of making to each other
. . . any donation of immovables, and if they make a donation
of movables it [could not] exceed one-tenth part of the whole
. . . estate.”100 Mandeville’s defense was that the property in
her possession belonged exclusively to her, “honestly acquired
. . . the result of her industry and economy during half a
century.”101 Chief Justice Eustis refused to view Mandeville and
MacArty’s lifestyle as disreputable, pointing to the pervasive
(moral) acceptance of their union and their embeddedness
within the community, stating,
It is obvious that this attempt involves the histories of both their lives,
their habits, their pursuits, as well as their pecuniary means . . . . It
appears that [Mandeville] had, in all respects, rendered her condition as
reputable and as useful as it could be made. Five children have been the
fruits of her connection with the deceased. They were all well educated.
Two of the sons are in business in this city, and one is living on his
income. The daughters were married and established in Cuba . . . . The
state in which she lived was the nearest approach to marriage which the
law recognized, and in the days in which their union commenced [during
Spanish rule] it imposed serious moral obligations. It received the consent
of her family, which was one of the most distinguished in Louisiana, and
nothing appears to have occurred to forfeit or to diminish their approbation and good will.”102

The implications of the case for public morality was not
allowed to trump the private (property) interests of Mandeville,
a free woman of color, whose own private moral legitimacy was
determined from her industry, wealth, and family connections. In
his opinion, Eustis C.J. thus concluded:
We are not insensible to the appeal made to us in this case, in the interest
of morals, religion and social order . . . . At the same time that we are
bound to give effect to our laws made in the interest of families, it would
be an abuse to bring them in conflict with the right of property, under
which the defendant claims the subject of the present suit. She bases her
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defence on that right, and we find no warrant in the law or evidence for
disturbing her in the enjoyment of the fruits of the labor and thrift of a
long life.103

The court agreed with the district judge’s appraisal of the
evidence, affirming the local judge’s wariness to classify MacArty’s
financial services (to Mandeville) as fraudulent or illegitimate in
any way, stating: “[w]e must let matters stand as the deceased has
thought best to leave them. From what is before us, we do not
feel ourselves at liberty to declare that the last twenty years of his
long life has been a continued cheat, and that he closed it with
a falsehood on his lips.”104
The supreme court was less sanguine in the cases of
manumission of slave mistresses, instead their inter-racial liaisons
with their masters were routinely viewed as contrary to public
morals. By so doing, the supreme court upheld the rights of
white heirs to ownership despite the wishes of the (deceased)
masters.105 Local courts however continued to uphold the
master’s wishes, rationalizing his private immorality in such a way
as to not disturb the system of public morals: one explanation
was that, as a leading legal historian has observed, “they were
only legalizing what was in some instances already established
practice — some owners no doubt treated their slave mistresses
and children as though they were free.”106 A close reading of
the opinions of trial judges reveals a greater attention to the
private morality of the master’s conduct and a silence regarding
the implications of such conduct for “public morals.”
In their opinions, local court judges often used religious
language, referring to master-slave sexual relations as “sin,” the
slave mistress as “being sinned against rather than sinning,”107
and characterizing the master’s posthumous emancipation of his
slave mistress as an act of final “atonement.” “Sin” is of course a
private act and the judges struggled to rationalize such sinful acts
so as to uphold the manumission deeds that they engendered.
Judge J.J. Burk of the Second District Court of East Baton Rouge,
for example, did so in this way in Vail v. Bird:108
The Testator’s life may have been bad — but not the end of it — the
Emancipation of Jane by his will is thought moral . . . such a vice in the
Master . . . required atonement; and the best earthly reparation to the
injured — and the most appropriate that as her personal condition of
slave had been abused by him — he gave her liberty to save her from the
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like abuse by another master.109

In Turner, Curator v. Smith,110 Judge Cyrus Ratliff, the trial
judge from the Parish of West Feliciana, similarly details his
reasoning for upholding the emancipation of the slave mistress
Rachael and her five children, in terms of the master’s atonement and reparations:
. . . that the slave Rachael was his concubine; that is true, but this
[emancipation through will] was long after the deed was done, and at a
time when the master wished to atone to some extent for his hitherto
immoral and illicit conduct . . . . The master having absolute power and
control over his slave, and she having no will of her own when opposed
to that of her master should not be held responsible for the vices and sins
of her master . . . to deprive a slave of the bounty or liberality of her
master on account of the immoral or licentious acts of the master, on
account of her yielding obedience to his wicked desires would be
punishing the weak and the helpless for the sins of the strong and
powerful.111

As Ratliff concluded, “such a construction would be in the teeth
of eternal justice and against every rule of right.”112 By construing sexual intercourse between masters and slaves as acts of “sin”
by individual white masters and attempts at manumission of slave
mistresses as “atonement,” trial judges contained such transgressions to the realm of private immorality, incidental or unconnected to the public moral or social order.
The Louisiana Supreme Court was less accommodating,
often viewing instead the emancipation of slave mistresses and
inheritance of slave children by white masters as directly arising
out of “open concubinage,” upending statutory order and public
decency.113 In contrast to the lower courts, the supreme court
averred that slave mistresses were legally (and morally) “concubines” as they were active participants in sexual transgressions,
and so incapable of receiving their liberty as “donations” (of
themselves) from the master, as Justice Preston opined:
It is true, the female slave is peculiarly exposed, from her condition, to
the seductions of an unprincipled master. That is a misfortune; but it is
so rare in the case of concubinage that the seduction and temptation are
not mutual that exceptions to a general rule cannot be founded upon
it.114

Similarly Judge Buchanan of the supreme court in Turner, Curator
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v. Smith also reversed the decision of the lower court by pointing
to public interest, stating that the provision in the decedent’s will
acknowledging certain slaves as his natural children was “offensive to morality” and so “without operation in law.”115 In five
of the eight cases involving inter-racial sex that reached the
supreme court, it acknowledged the implications of the case for
“public order” and “decency.”
In sum, whereas trial courts viewed sexual relations between
masters and slaves exclusively as acts of private immorality and sin,
the supreme court also approached them as contrary to public
morals, collective order and decency. Trial courts also rationalized the manumission wishes of a deceased master as a final
moral act of “atonement.” By so doing, they were able to give
effect to a master’s private wishes while also restoring the overall
morality of the patriarchal slave social order. However, by
emphasizing public order and decency, the supreme court
emphasized the written law and its legalistic construction of social
order, often subjugating the rights of the white master to the
rights of white heirs to “cast the opprobrium of concubinage
upon those he is entitled to inherit,” and to the collective right
of the State, to exercise the controlling interest in matters of
enfranchisement.116

V. Conclusion
This Article has argued for the recognition of institutional
complexity among the southern judiciary in guaranteeing
racialized social order in the antebellum period. This has at least
two central implications: the first with respect to southern law
and society, the second regarding the political development of
slave states.
First, the institutional judicial variation and inter-level
complexity holds clues as to the multiple, diverse ways by which
southern courts “made” social order—combining strict adherence
to the legal public order with a more flexible (privatized) order.
The institutional differentiation between Louisiana’s trial and
appellate courts enabled law to serve as the very “ligament which
binds society together,” to hold a vast gamut of hierarchical social
relations in place and establish workable boundaries of permissible behavior, whose slightest “disturbance” could cause the
“whole machine [to] (sic) tumble into pieces.”117 In this sense,
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this Article contributes to understanding how southern law was
able to meld the private interests of the governing slaveholding
class with its wider public purposes of preserving the integrity of
the law and of the system of white supremacy for all southerners
at large. In this account, the public and private functions of
southern law are found to be layered on top of the state’s judicial
structure, imbricating public and private order. As Peter Bardaglio writes, “Southern law did not simply reflect the narrow
economic interests of the planters and merchants . . . but
mediated social relations in such a way as to place certain
constraints on the actions of those in power while legitimizing
the position of these governing elements and contributing to
their dominance.”118 Through investigation of both trial courts
and supreme court decisions, we are able to see just how the
courts were able to do this.
Second, like prevailing work, this investigation finds that the
courts upheld white men’s privileges, demonstrating what has
been termed an “agrarian conception of republicanism” that
utilized government to preserve the individual autonomy of those
at the top rung of the social order: adult, white males.119
However, the cases also reveal this picture to be a partial one,
particularly in a civilian state such as Louisiana. As the laws
around race hardened, accompanying several internal and
external political developments in the antebellum period
(acquisition of Louisiana by the United States, the increased
commitment of all whites to the system of slavery, the gaining
abolitionist movement, and the state’s own increasing agricultural
prosperity), white men’s individual wishes and privileges, such as
manumission of their slaves, were increasingly held to a broader
public order.
This Article finds that the Louisiana Supreme Court
(reflecting its institutional stature as the state’s “court of last
resort”) served as the gatekeeper of this formalistic “public
order,” a more reliable guarantor of legislative social order, often
chiding local judges and juries for their apparent laxity. In
contrast, the local courts — through their reliance on juries and
their ideas of personalized morality — mostly upheld prevailing
status quos including possibly “disordered” ones, finding in favor
of white masters’ wishes to emancipate their “coloured” or slave
mistresses and children despite strict laws against concubinage
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and inter-racial sexual intercourse, or upholding the “honor” and
“reputation” of a “white” man (slander cases) despite a suspect
genealogy. Very rarely did local courts attempt to interpret the
intention of the legislature or positively implement legislative
public order.
In terms of political development, the supreme court’s gatekeeping function in the antebellum period points to its emerging
institutional role as a key actor in the preservation of southern
racial (and social) hierarchies; a role that would be augmented
greatly during Reconstruction, when, in the absence of a slave
state, southern (superior) courts would come to actively preserve
southern racialized social order from Federal constitutional
incursions.120
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